πŸ€‘ Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc.

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Get free access to the complete judgment in MEISTRICH v. CASINO ARENA ATTRACTIONS, INC on CaseMine. Case Information. CITATION CODES. 31 N.J.


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Law School Case Brief. Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc. - 31 N.J. 44, A.2d 90 (). Rule: There is no reason to charge assumption of the risk in​.


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Meistrich v. Register to read the complete case Meistrich (P) was skating on Casino Arena Attractions, Inc.'s (D) rink when he noticed the ice was too hard.


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sumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 La. L. Rev. 5 (). 3. See generally Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, A.2d. 90 (​).


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Opinion for Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., A.2d , 54 N.J. Super. "Ladies and gentlemen, this has been a case somewhat different than.


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sumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 La. L. Rev. 5 (). 3. See generally Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, A.2d. 90 (​).


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Meistrich sued Casino for negligence. After a jury trial, the court instructed the jury that if Meistrich knew, or reasonably should have known of the risk or falling and.


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Meistrich v. Register to read the complete case Meistrich (P) was skating on Casino Arena Attractions, Inc.'s (D) rink when he noticed the ice was too hard.


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Meistrich v. Casino Area Attractions, Inc. case brief summary A.2d 90 (). CASE SYNOPSIS. Defendant ice-skating rink operator sought.


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Meistrich. v. Casino. Arena. Attractions,. Inc. Skater. (P). v. Ice. rink. operator. (D). N.J. Sup. Ct., 31 NATURE. OF. CASE: Action for damages for negligence.


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R (on the application of Hallam & Nealon) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for Justice (Respondent)

So it may be one thing to raise the bar as a matter of law if a man entered a blazing structure to retrieve a fedora, but something else thus to bar him if his purpose was to rescue a child. Benton v. Hendrikson v. Erie R. Plaintiff was injured by a fall while ice-skating on a rink operated by defendant. Quite obviously, the expression simply stated in other terms the basic thought that the master had not breached his duty. Reverting again to the soil of origin, we find the servant was held to have assumed the risk of a negligently created hazard if he continued to work with knowledge of it. It also concluded there was no evidence of contributory negligence and hence that issue should not have been submitted to the jury. It was not required to be pleaded and the burden of proof was not upon the master. That assumption of risk as thus used was not a separate defense but rather another way of saying the defendant was not negligent, is further evident from the frequent statement that a servant did not assume the risk of his master's negligence. But the master could press an affirmative defense, as to which the burden of pleading and proof was his, that plaintiff should nonetheless fail because he voluntarily exposed himself to a risk negligently created by the master. International Ry. Indeed in Hartman v. The Appellate Division found error in the charge of assumption of the risk. Taylor v. We however agree with defendant that the issue of contributory negligence was properly left to the trier of the facts. Rather the just approach, as with respect to other applications of contributory negligence, is to leave the issue to the jury if reasonable men may disagree or to decide it as a matter of law if there is no room for difference in evaluation. Plaintiff's counsel objected to the charge, making specific reference to the introduction of "proximate cause" in the court's treatment of assumption of risk and adding "It is confusing in my mind and I don't see how the jury can understand it. We cannot exclude a likelihood that the trial judge unwittingly uttered the wrong phrase, and being unaware of the slip, failed to comprehend the objection made. Des Moines Edison Light Co. The Appellate Division also found the trial court failed to differentiate between assumption of risk and contributory negligence. In its primary sense, it is accurate to say plaintiff assumed the risk whether or not he was "at fault," for the truth thereby expressed in alternate terminology is that defendant was not negligent. Defendant urges there was no negligence and therefore the alleged errors were harmless. Thus two utterly distinct thoughts bore the same label with inevitable confusion. Unhappily, that defense was also called assumption of risk. We may note at once that our cases describe these two "defenses" as "barely distinguishable," Castino v. Hence if the servant established that his injury was caused by a risk created by the master's breach of duty to furnish a reasonably safe place to work, assumption of the risk in the primary sense necessarily was negated. The rigor of that rule was later tempered by permitting an employee to rely for a reasonable period upon the master's promise to rectify the negligent condition. Carton, of counsel. If the employee knew or ought to have known of the hazard, he was barred even though he was guilty of no "fault" beyond continuing to work. Plaintiff had noted that his skates slipped on turns. Boulevard Arena, supra 35 N. Camden Coke Co. Assumption of risk, in that sense, was not a separate defense. The facts appear in the opinion of the Appellate Division and need not be repeated in detail. Izsa, 26 N. The jury found for defendant. Assumption of risk is a term of several meanings. Martin v. Ellison Realty Corp. As we read the charge, the trial court expressed essentially the same thought, i. Lehigh Valley R. City of Brigantine, 23 N. If he discharged that duty, he was not liable for damages due to the inherent risks that remained. Although the rationalization of the foregoing common-law view was threaded with the fiction that the servant "contracted" for his master's immunity as a quid pro quo for the wages paid, it seems likely that it was but a harsh and improvident application of the familiar standard of the behavior of the reasonable man. In this area, assumption of risk has two distinct meanings. See Eckert v. Middlesex-Spotswood, Inc. Specifically we place beyond present discussion the problem raised by an express contract not to sue for injury or loss which may thereafter be occasioned by the covenantee's negligence, and also situations in which actual consent exists, as, for example, participation in a contact sport. Koppers Co. We here speak solely of the area in which injury or damage was neither intended nor expressly contracted to be non-actionable. The Appellate Division added 54 N.

Robert V. Cetola v. Long Island R. The words "the proximate cause, rule of proximate cause" appear in the charge at a point at which meistrich v casino arena attractions inc case brief are unintelligible and at which "assumption of risk" doubtless was intended. The proposition we have just advanced, that assumption of risk in its secondary sense is indistinguishable in its nature from contributory negligence, requires further discussion.

Whitall-Tatum Co. Carton argued the cause for plaintiff-respondent Messrs. Central R. The Appellate Division reversed, 54 N.

See Bush v. The error is traceable to confusion in the opinions in our State. In its other sense sometimes called "secondary"assumption of risk is an affirmative defense to an established breach of duty.

To determine if assumption of risk in its secondary sense differs from contributory negligence, the critical test is whether a plaintiff's conduct under the former is measured by the standard of the reasonably prudent man, for if it is, nothing remains to distinguish it from contributory negligence.

Horton, U. For present purposes, we may place to one side certain situations which sometimes are brought within the sweeping term but which are readily differentiated from the troublesome area. This approach has been embraced in our State. Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Trenton Trust Co. But in its secondary sense, i.

Horton, supra; 3 Labatt, Master and Servant 2d ed. A jury could permissibly find he carelessly contributed to his injury when, with that knowledge, he remained on the ice and skated cross-hand with another.

The master owed a duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work. In these circumstances, we cannot disagree with the view of the Appellate Division. In applying assumption of risk in its secondary sense in areas other than that of master edinburgh scotland casinos servant, our cases have consistently recognized the ultimate question to be whether a reasonably prudent man would have moved in the face of a known risk, dealing with the issue as one of law or leaving it to the jury upon the same standard which controls the handling of the issue of contributory negligence.

Boulevard Arena, 35 N. There was evidence that defendant departed from the usual procedure in preparing the ice, with the result that it became too hard and hence too slippery for the patron of average ability using skates sharpened for the usual surface.

Thus where the facts were such that assumption of risk was pertinent only as a meistrich v casino arena attractions inc case brief of negligence, the jury was instructed to deal first with the issue of negligence, and if negligence should be found, then to consider the "defense.

Izsa, supra 26 N.

The master, upon that postulate, was not negligent. His actions are such as to constitute a failure to use such care for his safety as the ordinarily prudent man in similar circumstances would use. And, we believe, the confusion has been further compounded by treating assumption of risk in its secondary sense as an affirmative defense different in its essential ingredients from the defense of contributory negligence, thus creating the potential of a verdict for defendant notwithstanding a jury's finding under the issue of contributory negligence that plaintiff exercised the care of the reasonably prudent man under all the circumstances. Chicago, R. In short the courts thought it indisputable that a reasonably prudent man would not continue to work with such knowledge, and thus finding no room for difference of opinion, took the matter from the jury. From plaintiff's account of his fall, a jury could infer the stated condition of the ice was the proximate cause. So also a single form of charge to the jury came into usage attended by the same obscurity. He might be liable if he failed to warn the uninitiate of those inherent risks, 3 Labatt, Master and Servant 2d ed. But if this be an incorrect view of the underlying thought process and if assumption of risk was then something other than a misguided application of the broad principle of contributory negligence, it would not matter today, for the common-law concept, however viewed, was discredited long ago at the very scene of its flowering. A discussion of the subject must start with the common-law action of a servant against his master, for it was there that assumption of risk emerged or at least was distinctly developed. Margolis, 20 N. The confusion was aided by the practice of pleading assumption of risk as a separate defense without indicating whether the purpose was merely to deny negligence or to assert an affirmative defense on the hypothesis that defendant was negligent. The remaining question is whether the trial court's charge with respect to assumption of risk was erroneous. On the other hand, assumption of risk may involve no fault or negligence, but rather entails the undertaking of a risk of a known danger. Di Menzo, N. City of Brigantine, supra 23 N. On the contrary, the servant had to prove the injury was caused by a risk other than one inherent in a well-run establishment, that is to say, that the master was negligent. We think an instruction to that effect is erroneous in the respect hereinafter delineated. We think there was sufficient proof to take the issue to the jury.